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1 Introduction
If foreign direct investment provides positive spillovers to the local economy, we would
expect transition economies not just to fully liberalize their capital markets, but to actually
go one step further and subsidize capital inßows. In the presence of externalities a simple
open-door policy would not suffice, and additional Þscal measures would be needed to
ensure high enough levels of foreign investment (see, e.g., Haaland and Wooton, 1999).
This belief in spillovers has prompted countries across the globe to apply a variety of
incentive schemes to attract foreign investment (Hanson, 2001).
Yet, some emerging economies have followed a much more gradual approach in
liberalizing the inßow of foreign capital. China, for instance, started opening up some of
its coastal areas at the end of the 1970s, following Deng Xiaopengs Open Door Policy,
and has since then continued to liberalize inward FDI in a piecemeal fashion (Chunlai,
1997). This slow dismantling of restrictions has been justiÞed as a way of limiting internal
opposition to the reform process (Qiang and Laffont, 1999). Of course other reasons
may have warranted a cautious approach to liberalizing the inßow of foreign capital. For
instance, we know that FDI may compete local industry out of the market, causing a
negative effect on the host countrys welfare (Glass and Saggi, 1999). In addition, the
empirical quest for spillovers has become increasingly elusive in recent years, undermining
the case for subsidizing and promoting FDI (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).1
The contribution of our paper is to provide a novel rationale for the gradual lib-
eralization of inward FDI. In contrast to the standard literature, we claim that the very
presence of spillovers may actually require temporarily restricting, rather than encouraging,
foreign investment. This does not mean that we are taking a stance on whether spillovers
are prevalent or not; rather, we are saying that, even if spillovers exist, these do not neces-
sarily justify a big bang liberalization of foreign investment. This somewhat surprising
result obtains once we take into account two stylized features of spillovers: Þrst, technology
transfers  and subsequent spillovers  are limited by the economys absorptive capacity;
1The debate on the existence of spillovers is still largely unsettled though. For instance, a recent paper
by Keller and Yeaple (2003) Þnds signiÞcant international technology spillovers to U.S. manufacturing Þrms.
For surveys of this empirical literature, see Blomström and Kokko (1998) and Görg and Strobl (2001).
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and second, spillovers take time to materialize. By letting capital in more gradually, ini-
tial investment has the time to create spillovers  and upgrade the economys absorptive
capacity  before further investment occurs. This allows subsequent capital inßows to
beneÞt from greater technology transfers. As a result, the economy converges to a steady
state with a superior technology and a greater capital stock. It may therefore pay off to
tax foreign investment in the early stages of liberalization, and to switch to subsidizing
capital inßows only when the economy approaches steady state.
The model has the following features. We consider a one-sector small transition
economy. There is no domestic capital accumulation and no population growth. Time
is discrete. Foreign investment brings technology transfers, which through learning-by-
doing lead to an economy-wide externality with a one-period lag. The size of the learning
externality is limited by the economys level of development at the time the investment
comes in. Learning is nonappropriable by Þrms so that technological progress is viewed as
a pure externality. We compare the decentralized solution to the planners solution, and
show that gradual liberalization may be welfare improving.
The argument for restricting capital inßows in the early stages of liberalization can
be split into different steps. The Þrst step is to show that a given amount of foreign capital
leads to a bigger improvement in technology if it comes in more gradually. For example,
consider an economy that receives 10 units of foreign investment. If all 10 units enter in
the Þrst period, the technology transfers will be limited by the host countrys absorptive
capacity at the beginning of the Þrst period. If, instead, the 10 units enter over two periods,
the Þrst 5 units, through learning-by-doing, upgrade the economys absorptive capacity by
the beginning of the second period, so that the last 5 units are able to beneÞt from greater
technology transfers. As a result, the economys technology improves more if the 10 units
come in over two periods.
The second step is to show that gradual liberalization leads to a steady state with
a more advanced technology and a greater capital stock. This is easy to see: if for a
given inßow of foreign capital, technological progress is greater if the capital came in more
gradually, the returns to capital will also be greater. If the same capital stock can sustain
higher returns, then the same returns can sustain a bigger capital stock. As a result, when
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the economys returns to capital converge to the world interest rate, and a steady state is
reached, both the technology level and the capital stock will be greater.
The third step is to show that temporary restrictions on foreign investment may be
necessary to ensure the optimal outcome. The trade-off between faster short run growth
(with lower steady state welfare) and slower short run growth (with higher steady state
welfare) would be of no policy concern if it were not for the existence of externalities. But
given that technology transfers lead to economy-wide learning externalities, private agents
may not have the right incentives to time their investments in a socially optimal way,
in which case the social planner may need to intervene by temporarily restricting capital
inßows.
After analytically showing that gradual liberalization may be welfare improving, we
use numerical simulations to illustrate our point. A Þrst exercise assumes that the planner
can use quotas to restrain FDI. In our benchmark case, the planners solution increases
welfare by 2.7%, compared to a situation of complete liberalization. A second exercise
allows for the use of taxes (and subsidies) to regulate the inßow of FDI. In that case the
welfare gain rises to 11%.
The two stylized features of spillovers which drive our results require some further
justiÞcation. Our Þrst claim is that spillovers from technology transfers are not instan-
taneous. As pointed out by Young (1991, 1992), new technologies do not achieve their
full potential at the moment of introduction. MansÞeld and Romeo (1980) make a sim-
ilar point. In a study of technology transfers by U.S. multinationals, they show that it
takes time for transferred technologies to become known to local Þrms. Our second claim
is that technology transfers  and spillovers deriving from them  are limited by the
host countrys level of development. In other words, the absorptive capacity constrains
the set of technologies that can be transferred (Glass and Saggi, 1998). This idea dates
back to Abramovitz (1986) who argued that a countrys catch up potential depends on its
technical competence. There is ample empirical support for this view. For instance, in a
study of 69 countries Borenzstein et al. (1998) Þnd that the absorptive capacity of devel-
oping economies  as measured by their stock of human capital  limits the adoption of
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advanced technologies.2
Compared to the theoretical work on absorptive capacity (Keller, 1996; Glass and
Saggi, 1998), the novelty of our paper is to assume that not only technology transfers
depend on absorptive capacity, but that absorptive capacity also depends on technology
transfers. This circular causality is important to understand our results. Starting off with
low absorptive capacity, large initial inßows of capital lead to limited technology transfers,
and thus to limited improvements in absorptive capacity. This, in turn, restrains the
technological sophistication of future foreign investment. As a result, the host country
may lose its attractiveness to foreign investors too soon, reaching a steady state with a
low capital stock and a low level of technology. It may therefore pay off to follow a more
gradual approach in liberalizing foreign direct investment.
2 Setup of the Model
Consider a small one-sector economy with initially a closed capital market. The aggregate
production function is
Y = AKα0 L
1−α (1)
where A is a technology parameter; K0 is the capital endowment; and L is the quantity of
labor, which is taken to be constant. In the closed economy there is no capital accumulation
and no technological progress. In the absence of depreciation, this implies that production
does not change over time. Assuming competitive markets, the economys rental price of
capital is
r = αA(
L
K0
)1−α (2)
Once capital markets are opened, foreign capital ßows in, accompanied by technol-
ogy transfers. To be more speciÞc, the economy attracts foreign investment if at the time
of capital market liberalization its rental price r is greater than the world interest rate r∗.
But this is not the end of the story. Foreign investment brings technological progress, which
2For further empirical references, see Keller (2001).
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in its turn leads to further capital inßows. Before describing these dynamics in detail, we
need to be more precise about technological progress in our discrete-time model.
The following two assumptions  corresponding to the two stylized facts in our
introduction  describe the nature and the timing of technological change:
Assumption 1 The set of technologies that can be transferred through foreign investment
at time t is limited by the host countrys absorptive capacity, measured by its technology
level at the beginning of time t.
Assumption 2 Technology transfers due to foreign investment at time t lead, through
learning-by-doing, to an economy-wide improvement in technology at time t+ 1.
The Þrst assumption says that technology transfers are constrained by the host
countrys level of technology. The rest of the world is at the technology frontier. Tech-
nologies can be ranked by their level of sophistication. As in Young (1991), there is a
natural order to learning: an economy must Þrst dominate simple technologies before it
can move to more advanced ones. The same holds for technology transfers through foreign
investment. The host countrys level of technical competence  its absorptive capacity 
constrains the set of technologies that can be transferred.3 The empirical literature largely
supports this view. An improvement in the host economys human capital or an increase
in its own R&D capacity has a positive effect on technology transfers (see Keller, 2001, for
a survey).
The second assumption says that technology transfers increase the overall econ-
omys technology with a one period lag. This happens through a process of learning-by-
doing. Learning is a pure externality, nonappropriable by Þrms, and affecting the entire
economy. This differs from the vintage capital story, where subsequent generations of ma-
chines become technologically more advanced. In that case, we would expect learning to be
vintage-speciÞc (Solow, 1960). In contrast, we say that learning leads to a general upgrade
in the countrys technology, so that externalities affect the entire economy.4
3See Keller (1996) for an excellent overview of the literature on absorptive capacity.
4Young (1991) takes an intermediate view by assuming that new capital creates limited spillovers to
older vintages.
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A further element of this second assumption relates to what determines learning.
The literature has generally considered learning to be either a function of cumulative
production (Young, 1991) or investment (Kaldor, 1957; Arrow, 1962). The former view
reßects the idea that learning requires experience, and thus time; the latter view claims
that learning can only be sustained through continued investment. In some sense our
model combines these two views: learning is a function of technology transfers  and thus
of investment , but it materializes with a one period lag.
Assumptions 1 and 2 allow us to postulate the following technology function:
At+1 = A
∗
t+1 − (A∗t+1 −At)e−λIt
where
A∗t+1 =
(
At + γ if At + γ ≤ A∗
A∗ else
(3)
An example may help to highlight the features of this function. In period t we start off with
technology level At. Foreign investment It in period t is accompanied by technology trans-
fers, which lead to a higher level of technology At+1 in period t+1. Technological progress
between t and t+1 depends in a concave way on the amount of foreign investment in period
t. However, this learning function has an upper bound A∗t+1, because the economys ab-
sorptive capacity at time t constrains the set of technologies that can be transferred. More
speciÞcally, the technology can never improve by more than γ between any two periods t
and t+ 1, without of course ever surpassing the worlds technology frontier A∗.
Assuming the capital market is opened up at time t = 1, the economys production
function now requires time subscripts:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α (4)
where Kt = K0 +
Pt
s=1 Is. Since returns to foreign capital are paid to foreign investors,
domestic welfare at time t is deÞned as the discounted sum of future GNP  i.e., the
discounted sum of labor income and domestic capital income:
∞X
s=t
βs−t{wsLs + rsK0} (5)
where ws = (1− α)As(Ks/L)α and rs = αAs(L/Ks)1−α.
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3 Steady state welfare
We start by describing the dynamics in the case of complete capital market liberalization.
Given that technological progress is a pure externality, nonappropriable by Þrms, and
affecting the entire economy, in each period capital ßows in until the host countrys returns
to capital are equal to the world interest rate. More speciÞcally, if at time t = 1, when all
restrictions on capital inßows are lifted, r1 is greater than r∗, foreign investment comes in
until returns equalize. By the beginning of period t = 2 the economy has learned how to
use the technologies transferred by foreign investment in period t = 1. This technological
progress raises the host countrys returns once again above r∗, thus attracting a fresh inßow
of foreign investment. These dynamics continue until the economy converges to a steady
state.
The next proposition says that in the case of complete capital market liberalization
the host countrys steady state technology will be strictly below that of the rest of the
world.
Proposition 1 Under complete capital market liberalization, the steady state level of tech-
nology is strictly below A∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The intuition is straightforward: if technological progress is not sufficiently strong to com-
pensate for the effects of capital inßows, the rental price of capital converges to the world
interest rate before technologies converge. While obviously depending on the shape of our
technology function, our claim makes sense: it is unlikely that foreign investment alone
will suffice to bridge the technology gap of emerging economies.
Imposing (temporary) capital controls increases steady state welfare. This is stated
in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Imposing (temporary) controls on the inßow of foreign capital raises the
steady state welfare of the host country.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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To understand this result, go back to our two assumptions: technology transfers are lim-
ited by the host economys absorptive capacity, and learning how to use those transfers
materializes with a one period lag. By restricting foreign investment, the economy has the
time to learn about the technology transfers from the previous period, thus upgrading its
absorptive capacity before more capital comes in. This allows future foreign investment to
transfer more sophisticated technologies. It follows that for a given stock of foreign capital,
the economy reaches a higher level of technology  and returns are higher  if that capital
came in more gradually. Therefore, compared to the steady state under complete capital
market liberalization, returns converge to the world interest rate at a greater capital stock
and a more superior technology.
4 Optimal path of foreign investment
Although temporarily restricting the inßow of foreign investment increases steady state
welfare, this comes at the cost of lower short run growth. The economy therefore faces
a tradeoff. On the one hand, limiting capital inßows increases long run welfare. On the
other hand, by slowing down capital accumulation and technological progress, restricting
foreign investment dampens the economys short run growth.
In this section we study this tradeoff by numerically solving the social planners
problem and comparing it to the benchmark case of complete capital market liberaliza-
tion. In doing so, we distinguish between two cases, depending on the policy instruments
available to the social planner. We start by looking at the possibility of introducing quotas
on foreign investment. Though this is enough to show that temporary restrictions may be
welfare improving, we would expect taxes to lead to a Pareto superior outcome by provid-
ing additional government income. In a second exercise we therefore consider taxes as a
way of controlling capital inßows, and conÞrm our prior. A further advantage of analyzing
taxes (and subsidies) consists in allowing us to compare our results to the standard case
for subsidizing foreign investment.
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4.1 Optimal path of foreign investment using quotas
In this exercise the social planner determines the optimal path of foreign capital inßows
using quotas. In other words, for each period a maximum amount of foreign investment
is announced. As soon as the quota for a given period is reached, no further capital is
allowed to enter.5 To determine these quotas, the planner solves the following maximization
problem:
max
{Kt,At+1...}
∞X
t=1
βt−1[wtL+ rtK0] (6)
s.t. At+1 = At + γ − γe−λ(Kt−Kt−1)
wt = (1− α)AtKαt L−α
rt = αAtK
α−1
t L
1−α
rt ≥ r∗
A1,Ko given
According to (6), the planner chooses both the sequence of capital stocks and the
sequence of technologies that maximize the discounted sum of future GNP; however, it
should be obvious that the Þrst and the last constraint imply that the sequence of capital
stocks determines the sequence of technologies. The social planners only degree of freedom
is therefore to decide how much capital to let in each period. However, for reasons of
exposition, it is more convenient to write down the maximization problem with respect to
both the sequence of capital stocks and the sequence of technologies. Note furthermore
from the fourth constraint that the domestic return to capital cannot fall below the world
interest rate. If technological progress takes the form of an externality nonappropriable by
Þrms, then under complete capital market liberalization foreign investment comes in until
returns equalize. Consequently, quotas can never cause returns to drop below those in the
rest of the world.
To solve the problem, we normalize the labor supply to L = 1 and substitute the
wage and the interest rate expression into the objective function. This gives us the following
5Alternatively, the government could auction off the rights to invest. In that case quotas would act in
the same way as taxes.
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Lagrangian
L =
∞X
t=1
βt−1[(1− α)AtKαt + αAtKα−1t K0] + µt+1(At+1 −At + γ + γe−λ(Kt−Kt−1)) +
φt(αAtK
α−1
t − r∗)] (7)
and the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions for all t
∂L
∂Kt
= βt−1[α(1− α)AtKα−1t + αAtKα−2t K0] + µtβt−1λγe−λ(Kt−Kt−1) +
βt−1φtαAtK
α−2
t (α− 1) + µt+1βtλγe−λ(Kt+1−Kt) = 0
∂L
∂At+1
= βt−1µt − βtµt+1 + βt[(1− α)Kαt+1 + αKα−1t+1 K0] + βtφt+1αKα−1t+1 = 0
µt+1 > 0 and At+1 = At + γ − γe−λ(Kt−Kt−1)
either φt = 0 and rt > r
∗ or φt > 0 and rt = r
∗. (8)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions, together with the initial conditions in (6), are then used
to numerically determine the optimal path of foreign capital accumulation. The exact
algorithm is described in Appendix B.
4.1.1 Benchmark case
To study the quantitative properties of our model, we assume that it takes two years
for foreign investment to have an effect on the host countrys technology. Though this
may seem like a long lag, MansÞeld and Romeo (1980) Þnd a mean time of four years
between a technology transfer and access to the new technology by local industry. We use
the following parameter values for our benchmark exercise: the world interest rate r is
set at 4%; the capital income share takes the standard value α = 1/3; and the discount
factor β is chosen to be 0.96. Given that we are considering periods of two years, this
corresponds to an annual world interest rate of 2% and an annual discount factor of 0.98.
After setting the labor force L = 1 and the initial technology level A0 = 1, we choose a
domestic capital stock K0 such that the initial domestic interest rate is r = 5.5% (or 2.7%
annually). In addition, we take the following values for the parameters of the technology
function: A∗ = 3, γ = 0.35 and λ = 0.05. These values are consistent with a realistic rate
of technological progress. We will return to this issue at the end of this section.
10
Figure 1 plots the capital stock, investment, technology and welfare (GNP), con-
trasting the planners solution (dashed line) to the case of complete capital market liber-
alization (full line). Though in our simulations each period corresponds to two years, we
have relabelled the horizontal axis in our Þgures to reßect years. This should facilitate
interpretation. As expected, restricting the inßow of foreign direct investment brings short
run welfare losses but long run welfare gains. Under the planners solution steady state
GNP stands at 3.8, compared to a Þgure of 3.64 in the case of complete liberalization, a
difference of about 5%. As for overall welfare, the discounted sum of future GNP increases
by 2.7% when going from complete liberalization to the planners solution. This difference
may not seem that substantial, but we have to take into account that the government is
not using the most efficient instrument to restrain foreign direct investment. If instead of
using quotas, the government were to use taxes, the difference would become a lot bigger.
This case of taxes will be studied in section 4.2.
The level of technology exhibits a similar behavior to GNP: its steady state level
rises from 1.35 under complete capital market liberalization to almost 1.4 under the plan-
ners solution, an improvement of about 4%. Note that in our model economy the tech-
nology level and the capital stock more than triple over a period of 30 years. This is
largely consistent with empirical evidence. As reported by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003),
countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Cyprus, Israel and Mauritius increased their pro-
ductivity relative to the U.S. by more than 25 per cent over the period from 1960-1995. In
the speciÞc case of Hong Kong that increase was as high as 78 per cent. The capital stock
gives a similar picture. Nelson and Pack (1997) Þnd that in the Asian transition economies
capital per worker increased four-fold over the period 1960-1995. A note of caution is in
order though: while over a period of 30 years our results are in line with the cited evidence,
it remains true that in our model economy most of the change happens in the Þrst decades
following liberalization.
4.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to have a clear understanding of what is driving the numerical results, we now
perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the main parameters used in the baseline
11
experiment. Figure 2 shows the performance of the model economy when the social planner
cares more about the future. In particular we try with β = 0.99. Compared to the baseline
case, this amounts to putting more weight on long run gains, and less weight on short
run losses. As a result, the planners solution entails stronger restrictions on initial capital
inßows. But the greater losses in short run GNP are compensated by higher steady state
GNP. Hence, the quantitative differences between the planners solution and the complete
liberalization are more pronounced.
As a second variation on the benchmark case, we lower γ from 0.35 to 0.1. This
corresponds to decreasing the economys absorptive capacity. Not surprisingly, as shown
in Figure 3, the differences between the planners solution and complete liberalization
become less pronounced. Indeed, it is obvious from our technology function (3) that a
lower γ reduces the option value of postponing investment.6 Conversely, a higher γ should
lead to stronger restrictions on capital inßows. However, there is a limit to that argument.
If γ is high enough, the absorptive capacity of the economy may coincide with the worlds
technology frontier. In that case, restricting capital inßows would cease to improve the
host countrys absorptive capacity. This is shown in Figure 4, which sets γ = 0.6.
A third variation on the benchmark case involves changing λ. Figure 5 shows what
happens when we lower λ from 0.05 to 0.03. This corresponds to a more shallow learning
curve in each period; a given amount of investment leads to less technological progress.
Here again, the option value of postponing investment goes down, so that restricting capital
inßows becomes less proÞtable.7 As a result, the difference between the planners solution
and complete liberalization becomes smaller.
4.2 Optimal path of foreign investment using taxes and subsidies
We now solve for the optimal path of foreign investment, assuming the planner can use taxes
and subsidies. Compared to the previous exercise, we should expect taxes to be welfare
improving over quotas, as they lead to additional government income during the periods
6For a given level of investment in period t, the marginal effect on technology of letting in one more unit
of capital is λγe−λIt , whereas the marginal effect on technology by postponing the inßow of the extra unit
until next period is λγ.
7See footnote 6.
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that restrict capital inßows. Moreover, allowing for subsidies, in addition to taxes, enables
the planner not just to restrict, but also to encourage foreign capital inßows. Introducing
this possibility facilitates comparing our results to the standard case for subsidies when
there are positive externalities from foreign investment.
We must be precise about what is being taxed or subsidized. For instance, if
subsidies would only apply to investment, and not to the existing capital stock, this would
encourage capital to leave the country temporarily to re-enter as new investment. Also, if
only foreign investment were to be taxed, and not the entire capital stock, investors might
be willing to put up with returns below r∗ at the time of entry, to reap returns above r∗ in
future periods. To keep things simple, we therefore assume that taxes and subsidies apply
to the entire capital stock, and not just to new investment.
The social planners maximization problem can therefore be written as:
max
τ t,At+1,...
∞X
t=1
βt−1[wtL+ rtK0 + τ t(Kt −K0)] (9)
s.t. At+1 = At + γ − γe−λ(Kt−Kt−1)
wt = (1− α)AtKαt L−α
rt = αAtK
α−1
t L
1−α
τ t = rt − r∗
A1,Ko given
The planner chooses a sequence of tax rates and technologies that maximizes the discounted
sum of future GNP plus tax revenues from foreign capital. Though we said before that
taxes apply to the entire capital stock, in the objective function they only affect foreign
capital. This of course happens because nondistortionary taxes on domestic capital do not
affect domestic welfare. The Þrst three constraints are obvious. The fourth constraint says
that the net return to capital should equal the world interest rate. Since externalities are
economy-wide, and since taxes apply to the entire capital stock, agents invest until returns
equalize. As in the exercise with quotas, the Þrst and the last constraint imply that the
sequence of capital stocks determine the sequence of technologies, so that the planner can
only decide how much capital to let in by setting the tax rates. Note that tax rates can be
negative; in that case capital is being subsidized.
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Using the same parameter values as before, Figure 6 compares the planners solution
with taxes (and subsidies) to the case of complete liberalization. As with quotas, we observe
that in the initial periods the planner restrains capital inßows, using taxes. However, the
novel result is that in later periods the planner turns to subsidies to encourage foreign
investment. Compared to the exercise with quotas, using taxes and subsidies is welfare
improving. This was to be expected, as taxing foreign capital leads to additional income,
and subsidizing introduces a further degree of freedom.
To be more precise, using taxes and subsidies gives a steady state welfare level
of 4.44, an improvement of 17% compared to the case of quotas, and an increase of 22%
compared to the case of complete liberalization. Of course these long run gains must be
weighted against the short run losses. Whereas the overall welfare gain  as measured by
the increase in the discounted sum of GNP  from using quotas was a mere 2.7%, in the
case of taxes and subsidies the overall gain rises to 11%.
The optimality of changing from taxes in the early periods to subsidies later on
is not surprising, as there are two opposing forces at work. On the one hand, as in the
standard literature, the existence of externalities calls for subsidies. On the other hand,
having capital enter gradually increases the size of these externalities, so that taxes may be
needed. In the early periods after capital market liberalization, it is likely that the second
effect dominates the Þrst one, so that the planner chooses to tax. However, once we get
closer to the steady state, and capital inßows have slowed down, the Þrst effect starts to
dominate, so that the planner chooses to subsidize. Note that in the standard literature on
foreign investment and externalities, this second force is absent, so that the optimal policy
always calls for subsidies.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a novel rationale for the gradual liberalization of inward FDI
by showing that the presence of spillovers may require temporarily restricting the inßow
of foreign capital. This stands in contrast with the standard literature, which has always
claimed that spillovers call for the promotion, rather than the restriction, of foreign in-
vestment (Haaland and Wooton, 1999). Our seemingly surprising result is a consequence
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of incorporating two stylized features of spillovers into our theoretical model. First, the
sophistication of technology transfers  and subsequent spillovers  is limited by the host
countrys absorptive capacity. Second, spillovers take time to materialize. As a result, if
foreign investment enters gradually, it has the time to create spillovers, and upgrade the
countrys absorptive capacity, before more capital comes in. Subsequent capital inßows will
then beneÞt from greater spillovers. This means that a given amount of foreign investment
leads to more technological progress if it enters more gradually. Compared to complete
capital market liberalization, restricting foreign investment leads to a steady state with a
bigger capital stock and a superior technology.
Although it is well known that spillovers are limited by the host countrys absorp-
tive capacity (Keller, 1996), nobody has pointed out that the host countrys absorptive
capacity is also limited by spillovers. This circular causation leads to path dependence:
how much technological progress we get from a given amount of foreign capital depends on
how fast that capital came in. As shown by our numerical simulations, in such a situation
it may pay off to temporarily restrict foreign investment. Previous explanations of such a
gradualist approach to liberalizing FDI have typically relied on a political economy argu-
ment (Aizenman and Yi, 1998; Laffont and Qiang, 1999). Instead, in this paper we have
proposed a simple economic explanation of the same phenomenon.
A Proofs of Proposition
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof proceeds in two steps:
(a) Compare the technology function given by (3), henceforth referred to as technology
function 1, to technology function A = A∗ − (A∗ − A0)e−λ(K−K0) (where K −K0 is the
accumulated inßow of foreign investment), henceforth referred to as technology function
2. We show that for any amount of capital inßows, the technology level under technology
function 2 is greater than or equal to the technology level under technology function 1.
(b) We then show that under technology function 2 the economys technology level in
stationary state is strictly below A∗.
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Step (a) and step (b) then allow us to complete the proof.
Let us Þrst prove step (a). We start by showing that the marginal effect of capital inßows on
the technology level is greater under technology function 2 than under technology function
1. Take some level of technology A0. For technology function 1, we bias the results against
us by taking the marginal effect on technology when I = 0 (since timing does not matter,
we are dropping time subscripts):
∂A
∂I
|{I=0,A=A0} = λα (10)
where α ≤ A∗ −A0. Compare this to the marginal effect on technology of capital inßows
under technology function 2: ∂A∂I |A=A0 = λ(A∗ − A0)e−λK , where K can be derived from
the fact that A0 = A∗ − (A∗ −A0)e−λK , so that:
∂A
∂I
|A=A0 = λ(A∗ −A0) (11)
Since α ≤ A∗−A0, the marginal effect of capital inßows is weakly superior under technology
function 2 than under technology function 1. Starting off with identical initial conditions,
this implies that for a same amount of capital inßows, the technology level under technology
function 2 will be greater than or equal to the technology level under technology function
1. This concludes the proof of step (a).
Let us now prove step (b). Under technology function 2 we know that A∗ is only reached
if K goes to inÞnity. But as K goes to inÞnity, the return to capital goes to 0. Since the
world interest r∗ is assumed to be strictly positive, in steady state K must be Þnite, so
that the technology level must be strictly below A∗. This concludes the proof of step (b).
From (a) and (b) it follows that the steady state level of technology is weakly inferior under
technology 1 than under technology 2, and therefore strictly lower than A∗.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Take the sequence of accumulated capital inßows under complete capital market liberal-
ization, {K1,K2, ...,Kt,Kt+1, ...}, and call this sequence 1. Following Proposition 1, this
sequence reaches a steady state technology level A∗1 < A∗. Now take a different sequence
of accumulated capital inßows, {K1/2,K1,K2, ...,Kt,Kt+1, ...}, and call this sequence 2.
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In other words, the capital inßows during period 1 in sequence 1 are spread equally over
two periods in sequence 2; from then onwards period t capital inßows in sequence 2 are
identical to period t− 1 capital inßows in sequence 1.
The rest of the proof will go through the following steps: (a) It will be shown that
for any given level of accumulated capital inßows the technology level is higher in sequence
2 than in sequence 1; (b) This implies that in sequence 2 the technology level A∗1 is reached
for a lower level of capital inßows than in sequence 1; (c) we then design a new sequence
of accumulated capital inßows, sequence 3, which coincides with sequence 2 until A∗1 is
reached, after which we let foreign capital come in freely. It is easy to show that sequence
3 (which involves capital controls until A∗1 is reached) leads to a higher steady state level
of technology and welfare, compared to sequence 1 (full capital market liberalization).
We start by proving step (a) and (b). Initial productivity for both sequences is
identical: A1. In sequence 1 capital inßows K1 give the following technology level:
A1(K1) = A1 + γ − γe−λK1 (12)
As said before, in sequence 2 this same amount of foreign investment K1 enters equally
spread over two periods, so that once learning has occured the technology level increases
to:
A2(K1) = A1 + 2γ − 2γe−
λK1
2 (13)
The derivative of A2(K1)−A1(K1) with respect to K1 is strictly positive if K1 > 0. Given
that A2(K1) − A1(K1) = 0 when K1 = 0, this implies that A2(K1) > A1(K1) as soon as
K1 > 0.
To complete the proof of (a) and (b) we now show that if A2(Kt) > A1(Kt), then
A2(Kt+1) > A
1(Kt+1). (Note that Kt refers to the period t accumulated capital inßows
in sequence 1, and thus to the period t+ 1 accumulated capital inßows in sequence 2.) In
sequence 1 the technology level after an accumulated inßow of Kt+1 is:
A1(Kt+1) =
(
A1(Kt) + γ − γe−λIt+1 if γ < A∗ −A1(Kt)
A∗ − (A∗ −A1(Kt))e−λIt+1 else
(14)
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where It+1 = Kt+1 −Kt. Likewise, under sequence 2 the technology level after an accu-
mulated inßow of Kt+1 is:
A2t+1 =
(
A2(Kt) + α− αe−λIt+1 if α < A∗ −A2(Kt)
A∗ − (A∗ −A2(Kt))e−λIt+1 else
(15)
Given that A2(Kt) > A1(Kt), there are three possibilities: (i)γ < A∗ − A2(Kt) and γ <
A∗ − A1(Kt); (ii) γ ≥ A∗ − A2(Kt) and γ < A∗ − A1(Kt); (iii) γ ≥ A∗ − A2(Kt) and
γ ≥ A∗−A1(Kt). In each of the three possibilities, subtracting (14) from (15) gives us the
result that A2(Kt+1) > A1(Kt+1). Therefore, if sequence 1 reaches A∗1 in steady state, it
must be that sequence 2 reaches A∗1 for a lower level of capital inßows. This completes
the proof (a) and (b).
We now prove part (c). The capital inßows in sequence 3 are identical to those in
sequence 2 until A∗1 is reached; after that the capital market is fully liberalized, so that
capital inßows are determined by the condition that returns to capital should equal the
world interest rate. From (b) we know that sequence 2, and thus sequence 3, reaches A∗1
for an accumulated stock of foreign capital inferior to that in sequence 1. This implies that
returns to capital are strictly above r∗. At this point capital markets are fully liberalized,
so that capital comes in until returns equalize. Since the technology level in sequence 3 is
equal to the steady state level in sequence 1, it is obvious that after the inßow of foreign
investment the capital stock in sequence 3 will likewise equal the steady state capital stock
in sequence 1. The difference, however, is that sequence 3 has not reached steady state.
Since there has been a strictly positive inßow of foreign capital, the technology level in the
next period increases, thus pushing returns to capital back above r∗. This leads to further
capital inßows, so that in the steady state corresponding to sequence 3 both the capital
stock and the technology level are greater than in sequence 1.
B The Computational Algorithm
The computational procedure used to solve for the optimal solution of the model follows
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and it is an iterative technique often referred to as Gauss-
Seidel method. Notice that since the economy undergoes a transition in which conditions
change over time and the social planner is assumed to take into account the consequences
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of current actions on the entire path of future levels of technology, it is necessary to solve
simultaneously for allocations in all transition years, so that the solution is time consistent.
In order to implement this procedure we assume that the economy reaches a steady state in
500 periods and we have checked that it was not binding (in fact in all of the experiments a
steady state is reached before period 30). After working out with the Þrst order conditions
and substituting away the path of technology, we arrive to the following optimal condition
for each Kt at each t
βt−1Atα(1− α)[Kα−1t −Kα−1t K0] + βtγλe−λ(Kt−Kt−1)[(1− α)Kαt+1 + αKα−1t+1 K0] +
∞X
i=1
βt+i[γλe−λ(Kt−Kt−1) − γλe−λ(Kt+1−Kt)][(1− α)Kαt+i+1 + αKα−1t+i+1K0] = 0. (16)
Then, the steps of the algorithm are the following.
 Given initial conditions K0 and the initial state of technology A1 provide a guess for
the path of the capital stock {Kt}t=500t=1 .
 Using {Kt}t=500t=1 , and the current state of technology At, obtain the optimal capital
stock chosen by the planner for each t {K∗t }t=500t=1 , by means of the Þrst order condi-
tions, subject to the constraint that the maximum inßow of capital is restricted by
the world interest rates.
 If the implied {K∗t }t=500t=1 are equal to the guesses of the Þrst step the algorithm is
stopped. If not, update the guess and go back to the Þrst step.
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Figure 1: Quotas vs. complete liberalization (benchmark case)
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Figure 2: Quotas vs. complete liberalization (high discount factor).
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Figure 3: Quotas vs. complete liberalization (low absorptive capacity)
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Figure 4: Quotas vs. complete liberalization (very high absorptive capacity)
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Figure 5: Quotas vs. complete liberalization (shallow learning curve)
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Figure 6: Taxes (and subsidies) vs. complete liberalization (benchmark case)
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